853 A.2d 767
Docket: Lin-03-266.Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.Argued: November 5, 2003.
Decided: June 24, 2004.
Appeal from Superior Court, Lincoln County, Warren, J.
Thomas J. Connolly, Esq. (orally), Portland, ME, Attorney for plaintiff.
Thomas S. Majerison, Esq. (orally), Norman, Hanson DeTroy, LLC Portland, ME, Attorney for defendant.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
CLIFFORD, J.
[¶ 1] Peerless Insurance Co. appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Warren, J.), following a jury trial, awarding Maine Farms Venison, Inc. damages for the death of deer owned by Maine Farms and insured by Peerless.
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Maine Farms’s suit alleges, and the jury found, that the deer were killed by lightning, a covered loss under its insurance policy issued by Peerless. Maine Farms cross-appeals from the court’s (1) entry of a summary judgment in favor of Peerless on its claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation; (2) entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Peerless on its claim of unfair claims practices; and (3) orders limiting its damages, and reducing the damages through remittitur. We conclude that, contrary to the contentions of Peerless, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the deer were killed by lightning and thus, the deaths were covered under Maine Farms’s insurance policy. We agree with Peerless, however, that Maine Farms presented sufficient evidence only as to its contract claim, and that Maine Farms failed to prove that it was entitled to damages over and above the contract damages. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment in favor of Maine Farms in the amount of $38,500.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Maine Farms operates a farm in the Town of Jefferson, on which it raises deer to sell as deer meat. Following Hurricane Floyd, and what Maine Farms asserts to have been a lightning storm on September 16-17, 1999, Maine Farms discovered that many of its deer had died.
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practices counts survived pretrial motions and went to trial.
[¶ 9] At trial, the court, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(a), entered judgment in favor of Peerless on Maine Farms’s claim for unfair claims practices. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Maine Farms, finding that lightning killed 154 of Maine Farms’s deer and that Maine Farms sustained damages in the amount of $255,433. Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 59, Peerless moved for a new trial, and the court issued an order granting Peerless a new trial unless Maine Farms agreed to remit damages in excess of $107,220. See M.R. Civ. P. 59(a). Maine Farms accepted the remittitur. Peerless then filed this appeal and Maine Farms cross-appealed.II. LIABILITY
A. Lightning as the Cause of Death of the Deer
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Richard Kithil, an expert witness for Maine Farms, testified that in his opinion lightning was present at Maine Farms during the night at issue. Kithil relied on the presence of treeing as physical evidence to support his opinion. He also relied on information that the deer that were killed were standing in water and those that survived were on higher ground. In addition, Kithil testified that it is impossible to detect all lightning strikes that occur.
[¶ 14] Dr. Robert Scott, a veterinarian who visited the scene of the deaths of the deer, testified that in his opinion lightning killed the deer. After eliminating other possible causes of death, Dr. Scott testified that lightning is the only thing that will kill a group of animals “virtually instantaneously,” or in the manner the deer were killed in this case. He based his opinion on test results that found no evidence of infection, bacteria, or poisoning in the dead deer. Dr. Scott also relied on pictures from the weather service showing the path of Hurricane Floyd on the date in question, and photographs of the scene taken by John Hilton showing the position of the dead deer. [¶ 15] Although the jury could have come to a different conclusion, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that lightning struck and killed Maine Farms’s deer.[2]B. Misrepresentations Regarding the Burial of the Deer
[¶ 16] Maine Farms contends that the Superior Court erred in entering a judgment as a matter of law against it on its claim of unfair claims practices. See M.R. Civ. P. 50(a). At trial, Maine Farms attempted to prove that Peerless, through its representatives and agents, made misrepresentations that induced Maine Farms to bury the dead deer, and that the burial of all the deer resulted in Maine Farms being hindered in its efforts to prove that lightning was the cause of the death of the deer, further resulting in Peerless denying coverage for the loss of the deer. Maine Farms, therefore, contends it was deprived of the money it was due under the policy, and that this in turn caused other, consequential damages to its business. This, Maine Farms asserts, constitutes a violation of Peerless’s duty of good faith and fair dealing. We disagree. [¶ 17] We have held that “in every insurance contract an insurer owes a duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured” in the handling of insurance claims. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 648 (Me. 1993). This duty derives from the insurer’s relationship as “the authorized representative of the insured.” Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Me. 1977). The party claiming breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has the burden of proving that the insurance company acted in bad faith or unfairly. See, e.g., Chiapetta v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 198, 202 (Me. 1990). [¶ 18] John Hilton, a Cheney representative, went to the scene of the claim in order to advise Maine Farms that Peerless would do whatever it could to facilitate getting claims personnel out there, but that it could be delayed because the claim arose on a Friday afternoon. Hilton was aware that Waltz had called some veterinarians in the area and that one of thePage 771
veterinarians, Dr. Pierce, advised Waltz to bury the deer for public health reasons. Hilton specifically told Waltz “that if he intended to bury the deer, that the least he should do would be to preserve at least one or two of the dead deer carcasses so that the claims adjuster would have some evidence to examine and possibly have examined by, you know, independent parties.” Waltz admitted at trial that Hilton never explicitly told him to bury the deer, and that when Hilton told him to save one for a sample, “in my mind it said he was giving me permission to bury the rest.” Waltz testified that he relied on Dr. Pierce’s recommendation that he should bury the deer for reasons of public health.
[¶ 19] That evidence is simply insufficient to support the claim of Maine Farms that Peerless engaged in unfair claims practices, and the record discloses no other evidence establishing that Peerless or its agents made misrepresentations in violation of its duty of good faith and fair dealing concerning the burial of the deer.[3] III. DAMAGES
[¶ 20] Both Peerless and Maine Farms make a variety of contentions regarding the damages award in this case. Because we find that Maine Farms failed to establish any cause of action other than breach of contract, and because Peerless is not required to pay pursuant to the insurance contract until Maine Farms demonstrated that it was entitled to recover for a loss covered by the insurance contract, Dolliver v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 111 Me. 275, 282-83, 89 A. 8, 15 (1913), damages must be limited to the contract damages set out in the policy of recovery of $250 for each of the 154 deer that the jury found to have been killed by lightning, or $38,500. Accordingly, we vacate the damages award and remand for judgment in favor of Maine Farms in the amount of $38,500.[4]
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment for Maine Farms Venison, Inc. in the amount of $38,500 plus interest and costs.
is misplaced because Spickler was based on former M.R. Civ. P. 16(h), which mandated the imposition of sanctions. 566 A.2d at 1388 (“if a party fails to comply with the requirements of this rule or any order made hereunder, the court shall impose . . . such sanctions as the circumstances warrant”) (emphasis added). Under the current version “the court may impose . . . such sanctions as the circumstances warrant.” M.R. Civ. P. 16(d) (emphasis added). The court’s decision not to impose sanctions was within its discretion. See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 2001 ME 71, ¶¶ 7, 16, 770 A.2d 611, 613, 616.
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