DHS o/b/o O’LEARY v. HAFFORD, 2003 ME 15

815 A.2d 806

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES o/b/o CARMEN O’LEARY v. MICHAEL HAFFORD

Docket Aro-02-357.Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.Submitted On Briefs October 31, 2002.
Decided February 4, 2003.

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Appealed from the District Court, Fort Kent, Daigle, J.

G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, Michael G. Keefe, Asst. Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for Plaintiff.

William J. Smith, Esq., Van Buren, ME, for Defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

DANA, J.

[¶ 1] Michael Hafford appeals from the judgment of the District Court (Fort Kent, Daigle, J.) concluding that the Department of Human Services (DHS) is entitled to recover a judgment for the back child support that had accrued prior to the time the mother began receiving Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC), the predecessor program to Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF).[1] Notwithstanding the mother’s affidavit that she had no wish to collect the pre-AFDC back support, the District Court found that, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2301 and 1606 (1998),[2] Hafford owed DHS $17,580.34. This sum contained three components:

• $9,452.00 for “past necessary support” accruing while the mother was receiving AFDC/TANF,

• $7,394.22 for “past necessary support” accruing prior to the time the mother was receiving AFDC/TANF, and

• $734.12 for the child’s medical expenses.

Hafford contends that the award to DHS of $7,394.22 for the pre-AFDC/TANF debt must be vacated.[3]

[¶ 2] Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1553 et seq. (1998
Supp. 2002), Hafford contends that DHS is entitled to past support payments only “to the extent that [DHS] furnished . . . support,” and that, therefore, DHS’s entitlement does not include the past support Hafford owed the mother accruing before DHS was providing benefits. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1553 (1998).[4]

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Because no court order of support had been established when DHS brought its action, Hafford reasons that 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2301(1)(A)[5]
limits DHS’s right to recover past support to the period DHS actually provided support. Instead, citing 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2301(1)(B),[6] he argues that DHS would be entitled to the debt only if a court had ordered support. Also, Hafford contends that when O’Leary applied for AFDC in July 1995 and assigned her rights for unpaid support according to section 2369,[7] no debt had been established, and therefore, there was no debt to be assigned by her application. Finally, Hafford contends that DHS has no right to collect money on behalf of the mother that she has expressly waived.

[¶ 3] We conclude that both the father’s child support obligation and the mother’s right to enforce it attach at the child’s birth, whether or not a child support order exists; Hafford had a statutory obligation to support his son during the mother’s pre-public assistance period but did not fulfill it; by applying for public assistance, the mother assigned her right to enforce that claim to the State and, thus, no longer has the power to waive it, and the granting of public assistance entitles the State to seek reimbursement for all unpaid support owed to the grantee. We therefore affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 4] Hafford’s son was born on October 15, 1988. Carmen O’Leary, the mother, supported their son without public assistance until August 1995, when she began receiving AFDC. The parents had no support agreement. [¶ 5] On January 2, 1997, DHS sought a determination of paternity and the

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establishment of a child support order pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1552
et seq. (1998 Supp. 2002), asking the court to establish that Hafford is the son’s natural father and to order him to pay child support directly to the State whenever the mother receives public assistance on the son’s behalf and “to reimburse the State of Maine for the past support, birth expenses and medical expenses incurred” on the son’s behalf. On January 31, 2000, the court entered a paternity order and judgment and a child support order against Hafford for prospective support, but “reserve[d] the issues of past necessary support, including public assistance, . . . for [a] future hearing.” Prior to that hearing, both parties submitted briefs on “whether the Department is subrogated to any child support debt owed by Michael Hafford for the support of [his son]for the period prior to [when]Carmen O’Leary [began]receiving [AFDC] on behalf of the child.” In October 2001, O’Leary filed with the court an affidavit waiving any claims against Hafford “for child support benefits for periods prior to August 1995 to the extent permitted by law.”

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] To determine whether DHS had a right to collect child support for Hafford’s son for the period before it began paying AFDC to the child’s mother, we consider two issues: [¶ 7] First, is Hafford’s obligation to support his child a debt that arose automatically by operation of law when his son was born, as DHS contends, or, as Hafford contends, must the debt be established by a court order or an agreement between him and O’Leary in order to become an assignable debt? [¶ 8] Second, if O’Leary had a “right” to child support absent an order or agreement, was she then entitled to waive that right six years after assigning the right to DHS when she applied for and began receiving AFDC? [¶ 9] Pursuant to federal requirements,[8] Maine enacted 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1552 et seq., specifying a father’s child support responsibilities. Section 1554 limits “[t]he father’s liabilities for past education and support” to six years.[9] 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1554
(1998). If paternity is in doubt, “the mother, the alleged father . . . or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child” may seek to establish paternity. Id. § 1553. Once paternity has been acknowledged or established, however, “[t]he obligee may enforce the right of support against the obligor. . . . When the State . . . furnishes support to an obligee, it has the same right as the obligee to whom the support was furnished, for the purpose of securing an award for past support. . . .” Id. § 2102. Finally, section 2369 spells out the quid pro quo exchange of AFDC for an assignment of “all rights to support for the child.” Id. § 2369 (1998 Supp. 2002).

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[¶ 10] Not only is a father obligated to support his child born in or out of wedlock, but sections 1503,[10] 1504,[11] and 1505[12] together indicate that a father’s duty to support his child attaches at the child’s birth, and sections 2301 and 2304[13] indicate that this duty exists even when the parents do not have a support agreement. [¶ 11] In our interpretation of the statutes, we have repeatedly endorsed the father’s support obligation and the requirement that he reimburse the mother for her support of their children. See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sabattus, 683 A.2d 170, 172 (Me. 1996) (biological father “owes a duty of support” to his out-of-wedlock child); Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Look, 606 A.2d 203, 204-05 (Me. 1992) (mother is entitled to receive child support help from the father for the period before she received AFDC); Jack v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 556 A.2d 1093, 1095 (Me. 1989) (acknowledged father “has had a duty at all times to support his child”); Dep’t of Human Servs. o/b/o Young v. Leifester, 1998 ME 266, ¶ 9, 721 A.2d 189, 192 (“Maine’s substantive law regarding paternity and child support is the Uniform Act on Paternity, which . . . allows the court to order past child support. . . .”) (citations omitted); Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Bell, 1998 ME 123, ¶ ¶ 1, 5, 711 A.2d 1292, 1294 (affirming DHS’s right to seek child support from father for the six years prior to notice of paternity). See also, the First Circuit holding in Mushero v. Ives, 949 F.2d 513, 519 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he language of the statute [19 M.R.S.A. § 272 (now 19-A § 1553)] as well as the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s interpretation in Jack . . . establish that the Maine legislature intended that fathers . . . are obligated to reimburse mothers for the necessary support expended on behalf of their children”). [¶ 12] If there is a support order, DHS has the right to collect “the debt due the department from the responsible parent,”19-A M.R.S.A. § 2301(1)(B), and the absence of a support order does not affect DHS’s right to collect, id. § 2304 (Supp. 2002). In contending that DHS is not entitled to collect past support owed the mother, Hafford misinterprets section 1553. Contrary to his contention, a public agency that “has furnished or may furnish . . . support” may “enforce” the liabilities of the father, while a private agency may recover only the amounts it has actually furnished. Id. § 1553 (1998) (emphasis added).

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[¶ 13] In Mushero, the First Circuit held both that the father is obligated to support his child and that DHS has a right to recover that support as a condition of granting public assistance. Mushero, 949 F.2d at 518-19. The Mushero court held that “[u]nder Maine law, all parents have a general duty to support their children. This duty exists whether or not a court or administrative order exists establishing a formal obligation.” Id. at 518 (citations omitted). The mother’s right to be reimbursed for her past support of the father’s children accrued to the State when the mother assigned her child support rights to the State as a condition of AFDC eligibility. Id. at 519. “Under section 272, AFDC benefits are considered `necessary support.’ 19 M.R.S.A. § 272 [now 19-A § 1553]. DHS, therefore, had the right — derived from [the mother’s] right — to be reimbursed for the AFDC benefits it expended on behalf of [the father’s] children.” Id. [¶ 14] O’Leary, like the mother in Mushero, “[p]ursuant to federal and state law, . . . assigned her support rights to the state as a condition of AFDC eligibility. The state, therefore, had a right to be reimbursed for the necessary support it gave [her] children in the form of AFDC benefits. It appropriately sought to enforce this right. . . .”Id. at 522. Having previously assigned her claim to DHS, her subsequent waiver is a nullity. We do not here address the question of whether DHS may retain any funds it collects in excess of the amount it has paid out.[14]

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.