850 A.2d 352
Docket: Cum-03-334.Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.Submitted on Briefs: December 12, 2003.
Decided: May 12, 2004. Revised May 26, 2004.
Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, Cumberland County, Warren, J.
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Stephen C. Whiting, Esq., The Whiting Law Firm, P.A., Portland, ME, Attorney for plaintiff.
Byrne J. Decker, Esq., Pierce Atwood, Portland, ME, Attorney for defendant.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
DANA, J.
[¶ 1] Charles R. Merrick appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) awarding Northwestern $10,140 on its counterclaim alleging damages for overpayments of disability benefits on two insurance policies. Merrick contends that the court erred in its interpretation of the policies and in concluding that the rental income he derived from his rental properties was “earned income” as defined in the policies. We agree with Merrick, vacate the judgment on Northwestern’s counterclaim, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Merrick began receiving disability benefits pursuant to three Northwestern insurance policies in 1994. After receiving full disability benefits for almost three years, Merrick began to purchase income-producing apartment buildings. For several years he noted the time he spent renovating or maintaining these properties on forms he submitted to Northwestern. On the advice of his Northwestern agent that rental income was not “earned income” as that term is defined in the policy definitions, he did not report the amount of his rental income.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 6] Merrick first challenges the Superior Court’s interpretation of the
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insurance policies, raising a question of law that we review de novo. In re Ross Family Trusts, 2002 ME 89, ¶ 5, 797 A.2d 1268, 1269.
[¶ 7] We resolve ambiguities in insurance contracts in favor of the insured. York Ins. Group v. Van Hall, 1997 ME 230, ¶ 8, 704 A.2d 366, 369. Contractual language is ambiguous if it is “reasonably susceptible of different interpretations,” Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vallee, 687 A.2d 956, 957 (Me. 1996), in the view of “an average person, untrained in either the law or the insurance field, in light of what a more than casual reading of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured,”Peerless Ins. Co. v. Wood, 685 A.2d 1173, 1174 (Me. 1996). Thus, the question presented is whether rental income plainly falls within the policies’ definitions of “earned income.” Because rents, dividends, and interest are paradigmatic examples of returns on capital,[1] we conclude that to the extent that Merrick’s rental income constitutes a return on capital, it is not “earned income” within the policies’ definitions. [¶ 8] Merrick also challenges the Superior Court’s determination that all of his rental income was “earned income,” a factual finding we review for clear error. Jenkins, Inc. v. Walsh Bros., Inc., 2002 ME 168, ¶ 7, 810 A.2d 929, 933. Although Merrick maximized his rental income by performing some management and maintenance duties himself (rather than paying a property manager to perform these functions),[2] the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that all of his rental income constitutes “earned income” as that term is defined in the applicable policies. Northwestern, as plaintiff on the counterclaim, has the burden of demonstrating how much of Merrick’s rental income is actually “earned income” pursuant to its policies. See Haworth v. Feigon, 623 A.2d 150, 160 (Me. 1993). [¶ 9] On remand and on the record before it, the Superior Court should determine what portion of the rental income is attributable to Merrick’s management and maintenance efforts during each of the years in question.The entry is:
Judgment vacated on defendant’s counterclaim. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.